Context
The conference “Defense, Energy, Technology: Europe’s Path to Autonomy in the Trump Era”, held at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, examined how Europe’s strategic vulnerabilities are being sharpened by a more confrontational international environment and by the openly hostile stance toward the EU embodied by the second Trump administration. Framed as the first event in a year-long research project supported by the Compagnia di San Paolo and the Centro Studi sul Federalismo, the discussion treated European strategic autonomy as an operational challenge rather than a rhetorical ambition, focusing on the interdependence of defense, energy, and technology.
Strategic autonomy as response to weaponized interdependence
Riccardo Alcaro opened by tracing the evolution of strategic autonomy from a politically contested concept to a practical response to coercion through dependencies. While the EU long assumed that economic interdependence would be stabilizing, recent experience has shown that it can be actively weaponized. Russia’s use of energy leverage, China’s control over critical materials, and the United States’ use of sanctions and regulatory power have all exposed Europe’s limited ability to protect itself from external pressure. What distinguishes the current phase is that the United States itself is now perceived as challenging not only European interests but also the EU’s institutional model and values. This has intensified internal European divisions and undermined the assumption that transatlantic relations provide a stable strategic baseline. Strategic autonomy, in this context, was framed less as independence and more as the capacity to reduce critical vulnerabilities and preserve political choice.
The “Trump trap” and Europe’s internal political weakness
Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali Nathalie Tocci, drawing from a paper she coauthored for the journal Foreign Affairs described what she termed a “Trump trap” for Europe: a coherent US strategy that views a unified EU as a competitor, combined with indirect support for nationalist and populist forces within member states that weaken Europe from within. Fragmentation thus becomes both the objective and the instrument. She added that Europe’s radical right has largely abandoned exit strategies and now seeks to reshape the EU internally, favoring a minimal Union centered on the single market while reclaiming national control over foreign and security policy. A central concern was not only the rise of these forces, but the absence of a strong counter-narrative. Pro-European and centrist actors, speakers argued, have often avoided a substantive debate on Europe’s future security and geopolitical posture, reacting tactically rather than articulating a coherent political project capable of mobilizing public support.
Ukraine, deterrence, and political decision-making
Support for Ukraine was presented as a test for Europe’s strategic autonomy. Rosa Balfour warned that failure to secure sustained financing could lead to Ukrainian capitulation in 2026, dramatically worsening Europe’s security environment and deepening internal divisions. The recent EU decision to limit veto leverage over frozen Russian assets was highlighted as an unusually bold political move, but the unresolved question remains whether Europe is willing to use those assets to support Ukraine militarily and economically. Several interventions stressed that supporting Ukraine is ultimately less costly than confronting a strengthened Russian position in Eastern Europe. Beyond security, Ukraine was also described as a potential source of military and technological innovation, with long-term implications for Europe’s defense industrial base should integration be managed strategically.
Defense: NATO, autonomy, and industrial capacity
The defense debate revealed a tension between strategic realism and sovereignty ambitions. One position held that a fully autonomous EU military defense against Russia is neither feasible nor desirable in the near term. Instead, Europe should prioritize protection against hybrid threats and rely on NATO’s existing command structures, gradually compensating for a likely reduction in US presence through a stronger European role within the Alliance. A more critical view warned that “Europeanizing NATO” under continued US supervision risks locking Europe into technological and industrial dependence. Genuine autonomy, it was argued, requires a European defense industrial policy capable of reducing reliance on US systems, not only for political reasons but also because of legal constraints and supply-chain risks in scenarios of simultaneous crises. Technology, scale, and coordinated procurement were identified as the main bottlenecks, alongside constraints related to skills, infrastructure, and capital.
Energy and technology: autonomy through transition, new risks emerging
The energy panel focused on a core paradox: Europe’s rapid diversification away from Russian gas has strengthened autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow but increased reliance on Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) imports, particularly from the United States. This new dependency differs structurally from the Russian case, as US LNG supply is fragmented across private actors and more flexible. However, vulnerabilities remain, including the possibility of US export restrictions for national security reasons and physical risks linked to concentrated infrastructure and maritime supply chains. Speakers emphasized that Europe’s main strategic lever lies on the demand side. By reducing fossil-fuel consumption through efficiency and electrification, Europe can structurally lower exposure to external shocks. From this perspective, the energy transition was framed not only as climate policy but as a security strategy. At the same time, the transition reshapes risk rather than eliminating it, shifting vulnerabilities toward critical raw materials, clean-tech manufacturing, and technology supply chains. China’s dominance across several clean-tech and critical-materials value chains was identified as a major concern. However, participants cautioned against treating all dependencies as equivalent. Dependence on fuels involves continuous flows affecting the whole economy, whereas dependence on materials and components concerns stocks and investment costs in specific sectors. This distinction implies different levels and forms of coercive risk. The discussion stressed the need for selectivity. Attempting to secure entire value chains across all technologies would be prohibitively costly and could slow the transition itself. Europe instead needs targeted industrial policies focused on the most strategically sensitive segments, balancing resilience, speed, and affordability. A fully protectionist approach was widely seen as unrealistic for an export-oriented economy, underscoring the need for a more coherent but calibrated European energy and industrial strategy that remains, for now, only partially developed.