Amid the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz after US‑Israeli strikes on Iran, Russia is quietly leveraging Iran's chokehold, higher prices and looser sanctions to boost energy revenues and entrench its central role in an imbalanced yet interdependent global supply system.
The launch of US and Israeli military operations in Iran on 28 February led to a significant closure, for an indefinite period, of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway for oil, gas and fertilisers, over which Iran is seeking to assert control. The Revolutionary Guards effectively decide which ships may pass through the strait based on their nationality and the payment demanded, thereby effectively undermining freedom of maritime navigation in this key area.
Caught in a stranglehold, importing nations must negotiate with Tehran or turn to limited alternatives. In this context, Russia, a long-standing ally of Iran, is exploiting the situation to sell its vast oil and gas reserves despite the sanctions in force since 2022, capitalising on costs and European dependence, particularly on fertilisers, of which around 20% of European imports are estimated to be of Russian origin. On the oil front, Moscow is benefiting from the general rise in prices: with Russian crude trading at between and a barrel, the discount relative to international benchmarks has narrowed significantly, resulting, according to some estimates, in additional revenue of between and .8 billion, narrowing the budget deficit by 1%.
This rebound comes amid a temporary easing of sanctions: for the first time since 2022, the United States has granted exemptions for Russian shipments bound for India, whilst Germany has partially lifted its restrictions on Rosneft, at the risk of undermining Washington's political credibility in the eyes of its European allies. For the latter, Russia is once again becoming a necessary, albeit constrained, link in the chain of diversification beyond the Gulf, via residual gas flows and Russian fertilisers redirected towards the Black Sea and Asia.
In Asia, India and China play a central role: according to several estimates, they account for around 80% of Russian oil exports, forming a foundation of resilience for Moscow's economy. Some sources indicate that India is becoming a major hub for energy redistribution by absorbing tens of millions of barrels of Russian crude per month, whilst China is securing its supplies via land routes, significantly increasing its imports and consolidating its non-SWIFT payment channels.
Rather than acting as a reliever, Russia remains a structural element of the current imbalance. Despite sustained sanctions, its role as a partial fixer in global energy and agricultural markets endures, supported by market adjustments and selective regulatory flexibility. This situation reflects the inherent complexity of Western sanction regimes, which seek to limit Moscow's influence while navigating the practical interdependence that continues to shape global supply dynamics.