After Starlink in Ukraine, States Move to Regain Control of Their Space Links

The space infrastructure needed to hold a front line is now owned by private actors whose objectives differ from those of the users who depend on it. In response, states are seeking to regain control of their links and to bring behaviour in orbit under a set of rules. Ukraine demonstrated this twice this month. First, Starlink service was restricted at the very moment it was indispensable. Then a Russian military satellite came within 100 metres of a Finnish-Ukrainian observation satellite.

The issue matters now because it is no longer theoretical. Responses are taking shape at the same time: industrial contracts, supplier selection, spectrum access and negotiations in Geneva. These decisions will determine, for years to come, who controls a country's links in a crisis. This raises a question that must be asked of every contract: who can cut off the service, and under what rules?

A Commercial Service Has Become a Lever of Command

The mechanism comes down to a single unilateral decision. According to reports, Elon Musk ordered bandwidth restrictions on Starlink that disrupted Ukrainian drone operations on the front line. Musk justified the restrictions by accusing Kyiv of diverting a civilian service for offensive purposes. At the same time, Ukraine stopped receiving information from the United States on missile attacks. The operator itself describes its service as civilian, yet it decides how that service may be used militarily. This gives it oversight of operations for which it bears no political responsibility.

This access vulnerability conceals another, physical one. On 18 October, the Russian military satellite Cosmos-2612 came within less than 100 metres of the Finnish-Ukrainian observation satellite ICEYE-X36. The manoeuvre disrupted nothing. It nonetheless shows that a commercial sensor engaged in a conflict becomes a direct military target of interest, without the protective framework afforded to a state asset.

Positioning is exposed in the same way. On 16 September, Galileo delivered the first authenticated civilian position fix using its Signal Authentication Service (SAS). The service is designed to protect against GNSS signal hacking and spoofing, amid rising cyber threats to positioning infrastructure. All of these developments follow the same logic. Communications, observation and navigation share one feature: their reliability now depends on technical and political guarantees that users do not always control.

Regaining Control of Links, Even at the Cost of Choosing Between Partners

Ukraine offers the most direct response. Its Ministry of Defence has signed a letter of intent with ICEYE and Nokia to develop sovereign satellite links. The choice of partners is logical: ICEYE is the very operator whose satellite was approached by Cosmos-2612. The first milestone was reached on 1 October, when the Ukrainian company HIMERA and its partner GomSpace placed the Obria Nano test satellite in orbit. The gap between a test satellite and a network capable of replacing Starlink on a front line remains considerable. The direction, however, is set: dependence must be reduced rather than negotiated.

The United Kingdom shows that sovereignty over military links also requires industrial choices. Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury has warned the British government over the Skynet 6 programme, a £2.4 billion contract. In his view, choosing Lockheed Martin would permanently undermine the UK's industrial position in the European space sector. Airbus's argument is as much about industrial affiliation as about performance. For a state, choosing a military communications supplier means choosing the ecosystem on which it will depend.

The same trend is visible among institutions and operators. Iceland has joined the Administrative Board of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) following Coreper approval on 30 September. Its membership broadens the participation of non-EU European states in the GOVSATCOM and IRIS² secure telecommunications programmes. On the commercial side, Telefónica, Orange, Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom have signed a declaration of intent to form an alliance and bid jointly in the European Commission's upcoming spectrum auctions. None of these operators, taken individually, matches the scale of the mega-constellations. Together, they aim to gain leverage over the resource on which everything else depends: frequencies.

The Balance of Power Now Plays Out in Spectrum and in Norms

Access to frequencies is being redefined, and not only in Europe. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has launched work on satellite spectrum abundance, announced in a statement by its Chairman, Brendan Carr. The US regulator's rules govern frequency access for constellations that operate far beyond US territory. Their effects therefore extend to everyone who relies on those constellations. The European auctions and the FCC's work are moving forward in parallel. How this scarce resource is allocated will determine which sovereign alternatives have room to exist.

On military behaviour, the reference forum remains the UN Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Discussions there cover both elements of a legally binding instrument and non-binding norms for space security.

This work leaves one decisive issue unresolved. Neither approach explicitly addresses the case of a private operator that unilaterally restricts a service on which an armed force depends. Yet this is precisely the vulnerability that the Ukrainian case has exposed most clearly. For industry leaders, the implications are concrete. The resilience of an offering will no longer be measured solely by its coverage or bandwidth. It will also depend on the ability to guarantee signal authentication, service continuity and asset protection against hostile manoeuvres.

In Brief

• NASA's Swift telescope, nearing the end of its life after 22 years in service, is set for an uncontrolled atmospheric re-entry following the recent failure of a private robotic servicing mission intended to save it.
• The rush to low Earth orbit is creating a shortage of critical components and raw materials, exacerbated by competition from data centres dedicated to artificial intelligence.
• Amazon plans to invest more than €16 billion in Germany in 2027, partly for its Leo satellite constellation, which is to rely on 24 launches booked with Arianespace.
• NASA plans to test the SpaceX and Blue Origin lunar landers in Earth orbit during the crewed Artemis 3 mission this summer.

What to Watch

• 10 November 2026: vote in the European Parliament's ITRE Committee in Brussels on the EU Space Act, Parliament's first formal position ahead of the plenary mandate and the opening of trilogues with the Council.
• 19 November 2026: FCC monthly open meeting in Washington, featuring the presentation of the regulatory framework against satellite communications jamming.
• 23–27 November 2026: fourth session of the OEWG PAROS at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, focused on space security norms.

Key Takeaways

• UN discussions on space security do not explicitly address a private operator unilaterally restricting a service on which an armed force depends.
• Following the Starlink restrictions, Ukraine plans to develop sovereign satellite links with ICEYE and Nokia in order to reduce its dependence rather than negotiate it.
• Every contract must specify who can cut off the service and under what rules, because choosing a supplier means choosing the ecosystem on which one will depend.

Photo: SpaceX / Unsplash